The survival ratio
DSS normalizes a single quantity: how much of your original equity survives if the tenant vacates at lease expiration and you must re-lease a dark shell.
Survival Ratio = Net Terminal Equity ÷ Original Equity
DSS = the survival ratio normalized to a 0–100 score, computed per scenario. Modeled estimate under stated assumptions; not an appraisal.
Three scenarios
Every property is scored across three vacancy scenarios. They differ by how long the shell stays dark, how far re-leasable market rent resets below in-place rent, and how much the exit cap widens.
Shortest vacancy, mild rent reset, modest cap widening.
Longer vacancy, deeper rent reset, wider exit cap.
Extended vacancy, steep rent reset, materially wider cap.
Surviving equity as a fraction of capital invested (Slim Chickens worked example), per vacancy scenario.
The headline band is a downside-weighted composite of all three, so the stress case dominates without ignoring base-case resilience.
Where each metric sits on the curve
The same question, asked of every number on a listing: is this typical, cheap, or weirdly cheap? We model each metric as a distribution and read where a deal lands. The math is identical; the plain-English read changes per metric.
Typical, cheap, or weirdly cheap for the asset class?
Is the basis priced fairly, or are you overpaying per foot?
How much runway does the lease have versus typical?
Is the tenant credit better, worse, or typical?
Listed forever usually means the deal or the price is off.
What return are you getting on net operating income?
Does rent grow with inflation, or are you locked at today?
All seven above, downside-weighted, into one score.
"Where is this listing on the bell curve?" is the only question worth asking, asked eight different ways.
Illustrative shapes. Each listing is scored against its own asset-class and geography cohort, not a single market median.
Assumption categories
We publish the categories of assumption that move a score. We do not publish the proprietary weights, coefficients, or calibration that combine them. Those are the model.
- ·Vacancy period (months tenant-dark)
- ·Market-rent reset vs. in-place rent
- ·Exit-cap adjustment (widening)
- ·Owner carry cost during vacancy
- ·Re-leasing cost (TI + leasing commissions)
- ·Sale cost on terminal disposition
- ·Debt assumption (modeled debt, interest-only)
- ·Tenant credit tier & remaining-term cushion
A Hosios-optimal 1031 matching market
A Hosios-optimal 1031 matching market is a 1031-exchange matching market designed so replacement-property supply is matched to exchanger demand at the efficiency frontier described by the Hosios condition in search-and-matching theory (Diamond 1982, Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 2000), minimizing search friction under the 45/180-day exchange deadline. Achieving the Hosios condition exactly is mathematically impossible in CRE because the bargaining set is not fully observable; we make the narrower, provable claim that by reducing search friction (letting buyers search against their actual need rather than against listing metadata) Shop 1031 approaches it. DSS is the friction-reducing instrument on the buyer side.
What DSS is not
DSS is a modeled point estimate under stated assumptions. It is not an appraisal, not a prediction of tenant behavior, and not a guarantee of capital preservation. Different buyer profiles produce different distributions; there is no universal "good deal," only good for your exchange. Verify all OM facts independently before transacting.
References
The matching-market thesis rests on the search-and-matching lineage in economics. The Hosios condition is the keystone: it states when a decentralized matching market reaches the efficient frontier.
- Diamond, P. A. (1982). "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium." Review of Economic Studies, 49(2), 217-227.
- Mortensen, D. T., & Pissarides, C. A. (1994). "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment." Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397-415.
- Pissarides, C. A. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
- Hosios, A. J. (1990). "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment." Review of Economic Studies, 57(2), 279-298.